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Abstract 
In the absence of financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the 
user cost of capital. With finance constraints due to moral hazard, investment becomes 
sensitive to cash-flow and own equity of firms. The impact of taxes changes fundamentally. 
Taxes reduce investment because they erode cash flow and, thereby, a firm's pledgeable 
income available for repayment to outside investors, and not because they reduce the user 
cost of capital. We propose a corporate finance model of investment and derive three 
central results: (i) Even small taxes impose first order welfare losses on financially con-
strained firms; (ii) ACE and cash-flow tax systems, which are investment neutral in the neo-
classical model, are no longer neutral when firms are finance constrained. (iii) When banks 
are active and provide external finance together with monitoring services, the two systems 
not only reduce investment, but are also no longer equivalent. With active banks, investment 
is subject to double moral hazard and the timing of tax payments becomes important. The 
ACE system gives tax relief at the return stage and provides better incentives than a cash-
flow tax which gives tax relief upfront. 
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When discussing the eﬀects of proﬁt taxation on ﬁrms’ investment decisions and eﬃciency,
the public ﬁnance literature often relies on models with full information where ﬁrms have
unimpeded access to external capital. Accordingly, investment is expanded until the
marginal return is equal to the user cost of capital. Taxes aﬀect investment only by
their impact on the user cost (cf. Jorgenson, 1963, and Auerbach, 2002, for a recent
review). The corporate ﬁnance literature, however, provides substantial evidence that the
relationship between ﬁrms and outside investors is subject to information problems that
tend to limit the amount of external funds that ﬁrms are able to raise (cf. the surveys
in Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Stein, 2003). Typically, outside investors cannot verify
whether the owners of the ﬁrm and their management team exert enough eﬀort or put all
available funding to the intended use. The corporate governance mechanisms that must
consequently be set up to ensure that external investors receive the appropriate returns,
can importantly reduce but not entirely eliminate the problem, and are costly. Hence,
ﬁrms with proﬁtable investment opportunities are often subject to ﬁnance constraints,
which prevent them from investing the desired, ﬁrst best amount of capital (see, among
others, Hubbard, 1998; Tirole, 2001, 2006; Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta, 2007).
This paper investigates the impact of proﬁt taxation on investment when ﬁrms are
ﬁnance constrained.1 The analysis rests on a stylized corporate ﬁnance model along the
lines of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2006), in which managerial eﬀort of
entrepreneurs is not observable to outsiders. Firms’ capacity to raise credit then depends
on the amount of pledgeable income it can credibly promise as a repayment to banks.
Investment becomes sensitive to cash-ﬂow and own assets.2 Proﬁt taxes thus impair
investment not by raising the user cost of capital, but by reducing the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
capacity, i.e. the amount of pledgeable income that it can credibly promise as a repayment
to the bank. The mechanism by which taxes aﬀect investment is, thus, fundamentally
1For feedback eﬀects of taxes on corporate governance problems see Desai and Dharmapala (2007a,b).
2Empirical evidence is discussed at the end of Section 2.2.
3diﬀerent from the neoclassical model with full information and no credit constraints.
Three important results are derived. We ﬁrst show that proﬁt taxes, by eroding cash
ﬂow and pledgeable income, tighten ﬁnance constraints and reduce investment levels,
independent of their eﬀect on the user cost of capital. For this reason, even a small tax
rate imposes a ﬁrst order welfare loss. Taxes thus aggravate a preexisting investment
distortion when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained in the absence of tax. Eﬃciency costs are
particularly severe when credit constraints are very tight, for instance because ﬁrms have
little own assets but large investment opportunities. To illustrate our analytical results,
we calibrate a small model based on stylized empirical facts and show that the marginal
cost of public funds in the presence of credit constraints can signiﬁcantly surpass the
corresponding tax cost in the standard unconstrained investment model.
Our second result demonstrates that neither a cash-ﬂow nor an ACE (Allowance for
Corporate Equity) tax system is neutral when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained. In the
conventional, neoclassical framework, these two tax systems are both investment neutral
and equivalent when both are required to raise the same present value of tax revenue. The
cash-ﬂow tax (recommended by Meade, 1978) allows immediate expensing of investment
costs, but denies deduction of ﬁnancing costs, i.e. interest on debt or imputed interest on
equity. The ACE system (as proposed by the Capital Taxes Group of the Institute for
Fiscal Studies, 1991) denies immediate investment depreciation but, instead, allows ﬁrms
to deduct all costs of ﬁnance, an imputed return on equity in addition to interest on debt.
In both cases, debt and equity are treated equally. Since only economic rents are subject
to tax, they are neutral with respect to the investment decision in the absence of ﬁnance
constraints (see King, 1975; Sandmo, 1979; Boadway and Bruce, 1984, for models under
certainty, and Bond and Devereux, 1995, 2003, under uncertainty). Due to their eﬃciency
properties, both tax systems feature prominently in current discussions of tax reform (e.g.
Devereux and Sorensen, 2005; OECD, 2007; Auerbach, Devereux, and Simpson, 2008).
The U.S. President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2006) also suggested a cash-
ﬂow tax while the recommendation of the upcoming Mirrlees Review on ‘Reforming the
4Tax System for the 21st Century’ is not yet known but seems to lean towards an ACE
system (Griﬃth, Hines, and Sorensen, 2008; Crawford and Freedman, 2008). Variants
of the ACE tax have already been implemented in Croatia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and
Brazil (Klemm, 2007). Our second main result then shows that when ﬁrms are ﬁnance
constrained, neither cash-ﬂow nor ACE tax systems are investment neutral any more.
Irrespective of the fact that both tax systems fully eliminate the tax wedge between the
user cost of capital and the market interest rate, they still reduce ﬁrms’ pledgeable income
and investment levels, although to a smaller extent than a tax system without expensing
of investment or interest costs. In spite of the detrimental impact on investment, however,
we still ﬁnd the two tax systems to be equivalent as long as bank ﬁnancing is competitive
and passive.
Yet, in practice, banks often play a more involved role and provide monitoring services
and advice (cf. Diamond, 1984). In fact, the quality of these services might be considered
an important aspect of ﬁnancial development. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) report,
for example, that multinational companies face substantially diﬀerent ﬁnancing costs in
diﬀerent countries. Our third main result therefore relates to a situation where banks’
monitoring eﬀort improves the success prospects of ﬁrms. The non-contractibility of
monitoring leads to a double moral hazard problem where not only the entrepreneur’s
managerial eﬀort but also the banks’ monitoring eﬀort importantly determine the ﬁrms’
prospects for successful investment. The timing of tax liabilities then becomes important.
While the cash-ﬂow tax provides tax relief upfront, the ACE tax gives relief at the late
return stage when the cash ﬂow accrues. For this reason, the ACE system provides better
incentives in a situation of double moral hazard. It leads to higher success probabilities
and investment levels even if both alternatives are required to raise the same present
value of tax revenue! Since investment scale and monitoring eﬀort are too low even in an
untaxed equilibrium, the ACE system is superior in welfare terms.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and analyzes the
eﬀect of a proﬁt tax on investment in the simplest case where no tax deductions are
5possible. Section 3 studies two speciﬁc tax regimes, the cash-ﬂow and the ACE tax, and
shows that, though equivalent in the basic model, they are not neutral when ﬁrms are
credit constrained. Section 4 derives the superiority of the ACE compared to the cash-
ﬂow tax when banks supply productive monitoring services in addition to giving credit.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
The analysis is based on a one period model of ﬁrm investment with moral hazard. All
agents are risk neutral. At the beginning of the period, the ﬁrm is endowed with assets
or inside equity A, which can be used for investment ﬁnancing. If the desired investment
level I exceeds own funds, the ﬁrm has to borrow the remaining amount of D = I − A
from external sources. We assume that all external borrowing is done in the form of debt,
new equity is excluded.3
Investment can succeed or fail. The success probability depends on managerial eﬀort,
which is not observable to outside investors. When the entrepreneur exerts eﬀort, she
generates a high success probability p, but must forego private beneﬁts. Alternatively,
she can spend only reduced eﬀort and, instead, consume private beneﬁts B > 0, leading
to a low success rate pL < p. Once eﬀort is chosen, investment risk is resolved. If the
ﬁrm fails, no revenues are generated and it cannot repay its debt. If it succeeds, debt
and taxes are paid, and the entrepreneur consumes her share of the proﬁts. The timing
is thus: (i) government policy; (ii) external borrowing and investment; (iii) managerial
eﬀort; (iv) outcomes and payments depending on success or failure. As a benchmark, the
next section derives the ﬁrst best equilibrium in the absence of moral hazard.
3Our simple two state model cannot distinguish between outside equity or debt, but this is also not
the focus of our analysis. See for instance Ellingsen and Kristiansen (2008) for an interesting but more
complicated approach that allows the endogenous determination of outside equity and debt.
62.1 Full Information Benchmark
When managerial eﬀort is verifyable and contractible, investors can enforce the entrepre-
neur’s high eﬀort p and deny her private beneﬁts. The entrepreneur invests inside equity
A with opportunity cost AR, R = 1+r, where the deposit rate r is exogenously given. If
I > A, the ﬁrm borrows D = I−A. The bank also incurs reﬁnancing costs on the deposit
market equal to R per unit of lending. If the ﬁrm is successful, its end of period value is
v = I + f (I) where f (I) is cash ﬂow, satisfying f′ (I) > 0 > f′′ (I).4 Given a loan rate
i, the ﬁrm then makes a repayment of (1 + i)D to the bank, and the government collects
corporate tax, yielding expected tax revenue T = pτf (I). To keep the analysis as simple
as possible here, we postpone a deduction of interest on debt to Sections 3 and 4. The
surplus for the entrepreneur and the bank are given by
π
e = p(I + f − (1 + i)D) − T − AR,
π
b = p(1 + i)D − DR, (1)
π = p(I + f) − T − IR.
Perfect competition in bank lending eliminates bank proﬁts (πb = 0) and leads to the
break-even condition (1 + i)p = R. The borrowing rate i must thus exceed the deposit
rate r by an intermediation margin that reﬂects the rate of business failure and subsequent
credit losses. The entrepreneur is the residual claimant of the ﬁrm and is entitled to the
residual cash ﬂow after taxes and debts have been paid. Due to the zero proﬁt condition in
banking, the entrepreneur’s expected surplus is equal to the total private surplus, πe = π.





  i ≡ u. (2)
Thus, in the neoclassical model, the ﬁrm invests until the return to investment equals the
user cost of capital u. Log-diﬀerentiating condition (2) shows how a higher corporate tax
4In the following, we will suppress the argument I when convenient.
7rate τ reduces investment,5
ˆ I = −ε   ˆ τ, ε ≡ −f
′/(If
′′) > 0, (3)
where ε is the investment elasticity with respect to the user cost of capital, which changes
by ˆ u = ˆ τ, where ˆ τ ≡ dτ/(1 − τ). The corporate tax rate thus inﬂates the user cost of
capital and depresses investment below its ﬁrst best level.
The marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) measures how private welfare changes
when an additional unit of tax revenue must be raised, MCPF = −dπ/dT. The marginal
change in expected tax revenue consists of a direct mechanical eﬀect and a behavioral eﬀect








, σ ≡ If
′/f. (4)
Investment being chosen to maximize joint surplus π, a marginal change in the tax rate






For tax rates close to zero, the investment distortion vanishes (cf. (2)), implying a MCPF
of unity. Higher tax rates, however, erode the tax base in proportion to ε and lead to an
increasing welfare loss.
2.2 Finance Constrained Investment
The corporate ﬁnance literature emphasizes that in many situations entrepreneurial eﬀort
is not verifyable to outsiders and thus not contractible (e.g. Tirole, 2006). This creates a
moral hazard problem which requires indirect incentives to elicit high managerial eﬀort.
The entrepreneur decides on her eﬀort level after a bank loan has been secured, so D
is already given at this stage. If she chooses to exert high eﬀort, she foregoes private
5The hat notation denotes percentage changes relative to initial values, e.g. ˆ I ≡ dI/I. Exceptions to
this deﬁnition are separately indicated.
8beneﬁts but generates a high success probability p. To highlight the reward for eﬀort, we
conveniently rewrite the entrepreneur’s surplus in (1) as
π
e = pv
e − AR, v
e ≡ I + (1 − τ)f − (1 + i)D. (6)
Instead of high eﬀort, the entrepreneur can choose to shirk which reduces the ﬁrm’s
success probability to pL < p, but allows her to consume private beneﬁts B. We assume
that these beneﬁts increase linearly with the investment level, B = bI, b > 0. Thus, the




e + bI ⇔ v
e ≥ βI ≡ bI/(p − pL). (7)
To elicit high eﬀort, outside investors must cede a large enough share ve of revenues to
the entrepreneur. Using the deﬁnition of ve in (6), the ﬁrm’s total after-tax value from
successful investment is split between the entrepreneur and the bank, I + (1 − τ)f =
ve + (1 + i)D. Since the entrepreneur’s compensation must be at least βI to keep her
properly incentivized, the bank can demand at most (1 + i)D ≤ I + (1 − τ)f − βI as
repayment. The right-hand side is the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income, i.e. the maximum amount
it can credibly promise to repay that still assures incentives for high managerial eﬀort.
Repayment and bank lending are, therefore, constrained by pledgeable income. In
principle, the ﬁrm’s own equity A could be so large that the incentive constraint is slack
at the optimal investment level in (2). Despite the moral hazard problem, the solution
would be the same as in the preceding section. To exclude this case, we impose the
following assumption which leads to a credit constrained equilibrium:
1 + (1 − τ)f
′ > β > (1 − τ)(f
′ − u) > 0. (A)
The last two inequalities imply that the entrepreneur would like to invest more as it would
increase her compensation ve. However, she cannot get the necessary external ﬁnance since
this would violate her incentive constraint. Hence, the ﬁrm is credit rationed and some
proﬁtable investments with a return above the user cost of capital cannot be realized.
The ﬁrst inequality implies that an increase in own equity leads to a proportionately
9larger increase in investment so that there is a positive leverage at the margin. Figure 1
illustrates how compensation ve in the good state must be above the line βI for external
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Fig. 1: Constrained Investment
Suppose now that (A) holds. The ﬁrm exhausts its debt capacity so that the incentive
constraint (7) is binding, ve = βI, and investment is thus implicitly deﬁned by
(1 − τ)(f − uI) + (1 + i)A = βI. (8)
Assuming that the incentive constraint is also binding after a small change in exogenous
parameters, diﬀerentiating (8) shows how the investment level depends on the tax rate






  ˆ A −
β
m
  ˆ β − εc   ˆ τ, m ≡ β − (1 − τ)(f




where 0 < m < 1 + i under assumption (A). The constrained investment level thus
again falls with the proﬁt tax. However, the mechanism is entirely diﬀerent from the
one driven by the user cost of capital in neoclassical investment theory. Here, the tax
liability reduces the ﬁrm’s pledgeable income that is available for repayment to outside
10investors. Consequently, less external funding can be obtained and total investment falls
(see also Figure 1). It is thus the average tax burden, and not the marginal tax rate (as
in the case of unconstrained ﬁrms) that determines the distortion in investment behavior.
Investment is also sensitive to the corporate governance parameter β. A fall in β implies
that the incentive compatible compensation that the entrepreneur must be promised can
be reduced by better governance mechanisms. This also raises pledgeable income and the
ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity.
Internal funds A play a crucial role for investment behavior in the presence of moral
hazard. Under assumption (A), dI/dA > 1, i.e. the sensitivity of investment to A ex-
ceeds unity at the margin. The ﬁrm invests the additional internal funds and at the same
time raises more external debt to further expand investment. This scenario is particularly
relevant for small and new ﬁrms with little internal cash available for self-ﬁnancing. In
more mature ﬁrms with larger values of internal funds, the optimal unconstrained in-
vestment level might not exhaust their debt capacity, so that the incentive constraint (7)
is not binding and investment is determined by (2). Empirical evidence conﬁrms this
pattern that credit constraints are severer for small ﬁrms (e.g. Schaller, 1993; Jaramillo,
Schiantarelli, and Weiss, 1996; Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta, 2007).
These results have important implications for empirical work concerned with the eﬀects
of business taxes on investment. The fundamental diﬀerences in investment decisions in
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms call for a corresponding decomposition of the business
sector. For unconstrained ﬁrms, the standard tax augmented user cost of capital is the
relevant determinant of investment size. For constrained ﬁrms, however, the analysis
should take into account measures of own cash or assets and proxies for agency costs.
The tax eﬀect is determined by the reduction in pledgeable income that is due to the tax
burden and does not depend on measures of marginal eﬀective tax rates.
Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Finance constraints not only change the impact
of tax on investment decisions but also fundamentally alter the eﬃciency properties of
11the tax and, consequently, its desirability for raising tax revenue. To illustrate this more
clearly, we again derive the MCPF. Expected tax revenue T = pτf reacts to a change
in the tax rate as in (4), with the exception that the tax elasticity of investment is now
given by εc in (9). Using banks’ break-even constraint R = (1 + i)p in (1), the derivative
of aggregate private surplus π becomes dπ/dτ = −pf + p(1 − τ)(f′ − u)dI/dτ, where
the term f′ −u is strictly positive. When investment is ﬁnance constrained, the envelope
theorem no longer applies. Inserting the investment response from (9), using the deﬁnition
σ ≡ If′/f, and combining with the marginal change in tax revenue yields the MCPFc








The main diﬀerence to (5) is in the numerator. The extra term arises because investment
is not chosen optimally. The credit constraint limits investment at f′ > u, leaving some
proﬁtable opportunities unexploited. Consequently, even small tax rates close to zero
impose a ﬁrst order welfare loss, making marginal tax costs exceed unity, MCPFc > 1.
Imposing a small tax on credit constrained ﬁrms thus induces a higher eﬃciency loss than
a corresponding tax on unconstrained ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 Even a small proﬁt tax rate imposes a ﬁrst order welfare loss when in-
vestment is ﬁnance constrained.
Positive tax rates make a comparison more diﬃcult since the elasticities ε and εc are,
in general, diﬀerent. However, in the special case where ﬁrms have no own equity (A = 0)
and technology is Cobb Douglas, it can be shown that ε = εc.6 Hence, in this case we
clearly have MCPFc > MCPF for all levels of the tax rate.
To illustrate the importance of ﬁnance constraints for the eﬃciency cost of proﬁt
taxes, we provide a small example and calibrate the MCPF in the constrained and
unconstrained model for diﬀerent tax rates τ. At present, statutory rates typically lie
6A technology f = Iσ implies ε = 1/(1 − σ). For the constrained case with A = 0, inserting β from
(7) into the deﬁnition of m yields mI = (1 − σ)(1 − τ)f, leading to εc = 1/(1 − σ) as well.
12between 20-40% in OECD countries, with a falling tendency (cf. OECD, 2007). We
consider the values {0,.1,.2,.3,.4} for τ. The empirical literature reports lending rates
on business credit around ten percent, so we set i = .1 (cf. Petersen and Rajan, 1994;
Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Tirole (2006, p. 98) reports a ratio of debt to equity
slightly above 2, implying an equity ratio of around one third. We set α = A/I = .3
in the baseline scenario, but also consider α = 0 to capture the impact of very severe
ﬁnancing problems of young ﬁrms. Empirical studies estimating the cash-ﬂow sensitivity
of investment support a value of   = dI/dA = (1 + i)/m = 1.3 (cf. Fazzari and Petersen,
1993; Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). To illustrate the
sensitivity of MCPFc with respect to this parameter, we also consider values {1,1.15}.
Finally, assuming a Cobb Douglas technology, the capital elasticity of output σ is set to
a typical value of σ = .3. Given these parameters, we calibrate I and β (see Appendix
A1) and then compute MCPFc according to (10). Table 1 summarizes the results.
Table 1: MCPF with Finance Constraints
MCPF τ = 0 τ = .1 τ = .2 τ = .3 τ = .4
Unconstrained investment:
MCPF 1.000 1.050 1.120 1.225 1.400
Finance constrained investment:
α = .3 1.143 1.177 1.223 1.287 1.385
α = 0 1.310 1.376 1.468 1.605 1.835
  = 1 1.209 1.251 1.307 1.387 1.511
  = 1.15 1.176 1.214 1.265 1.337 1.447
The ﬁrst row of results gives the MCPF in the absence of information problems, i.e.
when ﬁrms are not credit constrained. As discussed above, the excess burden is zero in
the untaxed equilibrium, but rises progressively with higher tax rates. The row α = .3
gives the results for the benchmark scenario in the model with credit constraints. Here,
the MCPFc is signiﬁcantly higher for small tax rates, but falls below the value from the
neoclassical model when the tax rate is high. This is due to the fact that the elasticity
13of investment with respect to the tax rate εc is lower than the corresponding elasticity in
the absence of credit constraints, so a change in the tax rate then has a smaller impact
on the MCPFc. The derivative of εc shows that this elasticity decreases with higher
values of own assets A, meaning that the ﬁnance constraint becomes less severe as A
rises. So reducing A to zero (α = 0) leads to very high eﬃciency costs of taxation. The
two bottom rows in Table 1 show that in situations in which ﬁrms can only raise very low
levels of outside debt for an additional unit of own funding, the tax-induced reduction in
pledgeable income also leads to greater losses in eﬃciency.
This exercise shows that when credit constraints are a strong impediment to external
ﬁnancing, the proﬁt tax can have a substantially higher eﬃciency cost compared to the
unconstrained full information case. When discussing welfare eﬀects of tax policy propos-
als, it is thus important to take into account that tax policy can have a rather diﬀerent
impact on constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms.
3 Non-Neutrality of Cash-Flow and ACE Taxes
The mechanism by which the corporate tax aﬀects investment diﬀers substantially from
the one at work in the standard model with full information. Will a tax system that is
designed to be investment neutral for unconstrained ﬁrms still be eﬃcient in the presence
of ﬁnance constraints? The cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes are known to be neutral in the
standard model both in situations of certainty and uncertainty (Boadway and Bruce,
1984; Bond and Devereux, 2003). Since they avoid investment distortions and yet raise
revenue, both taxes have attracted a lot of attention in recent discussions of corporate
tax reform (see Devereux and Sorensen, 2005; OECD, 2007; Auerbach, Devereux, and
Simpson, 2008; Griﬃth, Hines, and Sorensen, 2008).
To be able to represent both tax systems in our model, we now include a possible
deduction of the cost of ﬁnance, reﬂecting the expensing of interest on debt and an
imputed cost of equity, and a possibility for immediate expensing of investment. The end
14of period value of net ﬁscal revenue is, thus,
G = T − τsIR, T = pτ [f − λi(D + A) + sI]. (11)
At the beginning of the period, a share s of investment outlays can be deducted from the
tax base, thus leading to a public subsidy τsI at the outset. When capital is disinvested
at the end of the period, the upfront subsidy must be repaid. A positive share s thus shifts
the tax load from the beginning to the end of the period. The parameter λ determines
the share of ﬁnancing costs (for both debt and equity A) that can be deducted from the
tax base at the time the returns from successful investment accrue, and thus reduces the
tax liability at the end of the period. Private surplus now amounts to
π
e = p(I + f − (1 + i)D) − T − AR,
π
b = p(1 + i)D − DR, (12)
π = p(I + f) − T − (1 − τs)IR,
where T is given in (11). The credit required from banks is given by D = (1 − τs)I −A.
Due to the subsidy, the government acquires a stake τsI in the ﬁrm so that private debt
and equity need to ﬁnance the remaining share of investment only.
In the absence of moral hazard, i.e. when managerial eﬀort is contractible, banks lend
any amount D = (1 − τs)I − A subject to the break even condition p(1 + i) = R which
determines the competitive loan rate i. The entrepreneur thus chooses an investment level
that maximizes her surplus πe = π,
f
′ (I) =
(1 − τλ)(1 − τs)
1 − τ
  i ≡ u. (13)
Both possibilities of tax deduction λ > 0 and s > 0 now reduce the user cost of capital u.
The full information case replicates the neutrality result of Bond and Devereux (2003) for
cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes: The cash-ﬂow tax allows for immediate expensing but denies
any deduction of the cost of ﬁnance, implying s = 1 and λ = 0. The ACE tax, on
the other hand, permits full deduction of ﬁnancing costs, including an imputed cost on
equity, but denies an upfront deduction for investment outlays, s = 0 and λ = 1. Both
15systems yield f′ = i in (13) and thus lead to eﬃcient investment decisions when corporate
governance problems are absent. Since both systems also imply the same level of net
ﬁscal revenues G = pτ (f − iI) in (11), cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes are fully equivalent in
the unconstrained setting. The only diﬀerence between the two systems lies in the timing
of the tax payments while the present value of tax revenue is the same. This diﬀerence
in timing is, however, irrelevant in a world without moral hazard.
The question of interest is now whether ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes are still eﬃcient
and equivalent when investment is ﬁnance constrained. Given that the entrepreneur
exerts high eﬀort, she generates an expected surplus of πe = pve + AR, where ve ≡
(1 − τ)(f − uI) + (1 + i)A follows from applying the deﬁnition of u from (13) in (12).
The need to provide incentives requires that her compensation be ve ≥ βI, thus putting
an upper bound on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing capacity. As a consequence, investment is again
determined by the same condition as in (8), although the user cost of capital now cor-
responds to the extended version of (13). Diﬀerentiation yields the following response of













where, by assumption (A), m = β − (1 − τ)(f′ − u) > 0. As a concave production
function implies f/I > f′ and, in addition, f′ > u in ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, the
numerator f − uI of the ﬁrst term is positive. Both cash-ﬂow and ACE tax systems
eliminate the tax wedge so that the user cost is equal to the lending rate, u = i, and
independent of the tax rate. The tax-induced change in the investment level thus simpli-
ﬁes to dI/dτ = −(f − iI)/m, which is the same in both tax regimes. Clearly, cash-ﬂow
and ACE taxes are not neutral with respect to investment when ﬁrms are ﬁnance con-
strained. The comparison to (9) shows that the deductions from the tax base do reduce
the negative investment eﬀects, but cannot entirely eliminate them. However, the quanti-
tative eﬀect on investment levels and, in turn, on the present value of net ﬁscal revenues
G = pτ (f − iI) are identical. The two tax regimes are thus equivalent. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
16Proposition 2 When investment is ﬁnance constrained, ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes (i) are
equivalent, and (ii) reduce investment.
The neutrality of ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes in a model with full information (Bond and
Devereux, 2003) does not carry over to a situation when ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained
in their investment decisions. Any tax system that leads to a reduction in pledgeable
income has real consequences for investment, independent of the eﬀect on user costs.
However, in the simple moral hazard problem considered here, it is only the present value
of net tax liabilities that determines the investment distortion. The timing of speciﬁc
tax and subsidy levels has no additional impact. For any given equity level A, the ACE
system implies a larger pledgeable income by giving tax relief at the return stage, but also
requires more outside ﬁnancing because it denies the tax subsidy at the early investment
stage. The cash-ﬂow tax, instead, reduces the need for outside ﬁnancing but also cuts
into pledgeable income. ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes turn out to be fully equivalent when
banks are passive providers of outside ﬁnancing.
4 Superiority of ACE Tax With Monitoring
This section extends the basic model by endogenous monitoring of banks. This reﬂects
the productive role of banks in situations where ﬁrms are closely associated with one
main bank, or of other active intermediaries, which has long been deemed to be a crucial
element in the literature on corporate ﬁnance (e.g. Diamond, 1984). Indeed, monitoring
is a main reason for the existence of ﬁnancial intermediation and probably an indicator
of ﬁnancial sector development. We show that the timing of tax liabilities now becomes
important: monitoring incentives of banks will be stronger the larger their stake in the
returns to monitoring, i.e. the larger is the repayment if the ﬁrm is successful. A cash-ﬂow
tax system provides an upfront subsidy to business investment and thereby reduces the
need for external ﬁnancing. Consequently, repayment is smaller which impairs monitoring
incentives of banks and leads to larger failure rates. The lower success probability, in turn,
17erodes the entrepreneurs’ incentives and makes it more expensive to incentivize them.
When insiders must keep a larger stake to assure full eﬀort, pledgeable income declines
and externally ﬁnanced investment falls.
A Model With Monitoring: To formalize the argument, we introduce an advising
and monitoring role for banks that improves a ﬁrm’s success probability. As before, high
managerial eﬀort leads to a high success probability p > 0. Shirking, for simplicity, is
assumed to result in a sure business failure, pL = 0. Managerial eﬀort is thus crucial
for the survival of the ﬁrm. However, the success probability p with high managerial
eﬀort now depends on a continuous monitoring decision. The bank can further raise p
by more intensive monitoring but incurs an intangible monitoring cost c(p)I, which is
proportional to the investment level and convex increasing in p, c′,c′′ > 0. Both types of
eﬀort are non-contractible, giving rise to a double moral hazard problem. The surplus of
the entrepreneur and the bank are now given by
π
e = p(I + f − (1 + i)D) − T − AR,
π
b = p(1 + i)D − DR − c(p)I, D = (1 − τs)I − A, (14)
π = p(I + f) − T − c(p)I − (1 − τs)RI.
The tax T and net ﬁscal revenues G are given by (11). The tax system again allows for
a potential deduction of ﬁnance costs and investment expenses.
At the moral hazard stage, the terms of the credit contract, i.e. the loan size D and the
lending rate i, are already given. The entrepreneur chooses her eﬀort by comparing her
surplus under the two options, given the bank’s monitoring activity. The bank determines
the monitoring intensity that maximizes its surplus πb, given the entrepreneur’s eﬀort.
The two types of eﬀort are strategic complements: monitoring incentives are only positive
when managerial eﬀort is high. Conversely, a higher monitoring intensity raises success
probability p and, thus, enhances the entrepreneur’s return to eﬀort. The two incentive
18constraints are
IC
e : βI ￿ v
e = (1 − τ)[f (I) − uI] + (1 + i)A, (15)
IC
b : c
′ (p)I = (1 + i)D,
where the user cost of capital u is deﬁned in (13) and β = b/p as pL = 0. In particular,
the entrepreneur’s required proﬁt share β is endogenous to the bank’s monitoring activity.
The lending rate is determined by competition among banks in the market for busi-
ness loans. As the lending rate and the debt level (and thus also total investment)
are already given at the moral hazard stage, the bank’s incentive constraint ICb deter-
mines monitoring intensity and thus the success probability p. Anticipating the decisions
at the moral hazard stage, banks expand lending as long as the entrepreneur’s incen-
tive constraint is slack. Approving a larger loan size boosts the surplus of a bank by
dπb/dD = [p(1 + i) − R − c/(1 − τs)] > 0, which is positive as long as the break even
condition πb = [p(1 + i) − R − c/(1 − τs)]D − Ac/(1 − τs) ￿ 0 is not violated. The
credit is thus increased until the anticipated incentive constraint of the entrepreneur is
binding. As a result, the two constraints in (15) jointly determine the investment level I
and the success probability p. The equilibrium values of the success probability and of
investment and credit size depend on the loan rate i and result in a given banking proﬁt.
Competition in the credit market ﬁnally forces down the lending rate i and squeezes
proﬁts in banking until the zero proﬁt condition binds. Using the deﬁnition δ ≡ D/I ,
break even πb = 0 implies (p(1 + i) − R)δ = c(p). As opposed to the preceding section,
the intermediation margin must now cover the monitoring cost c and becomes endogenous,
leading to an endogenous loan rate. In what follows, we assume the functional form of
c(p) = p1+γ/(1 + γ) for the monitoring cost. The speciﬁcation implies pc′ = (1 + γ)c,
which, together with the bank’s incentive constraint ICb and break-even condition, yields
p(1 + i) = R(1 + γ)/γ. Given the isoelastic speciﬁcation, the expected repayment is a
constant mark-up over the exogenous deposit rate.
19Comparative Statics: To avoid a complicated analysis of tax base eﬀects, we start
out from an untaxed equilibrium and limit attention to small taxes only. The goal is,
thus, to derive the eﬀects of a small proﬁt tax τ on investment and monitoring intensity.
The initial equilibrium being untaxed, we evaluate the diﬀerentials at τ = 0. In (15), we
see that the investment level depends, among other variables, on the user cost of capital.
Diﬀerentiation of (13) gives the reaction of ˆ u = ˆ ı + [1 − λ − s]   ˆ τ. The lending rate i
is determined by the zero proﬁt constraint for banks. Given the above speciﬁcation of
the monitoring cost, the expected return on a bank credit contains a constant mark-up
over the deposit rate, and the lending rate thus only changes with the success probability:
i   ˆ ı = −(1 + i)   ˆ p. The diﬀerentiation of the entrepreneur’s and the bank’s incentive
constraints (15) then yields
IC
e : m   ˆ I = [f/I + 1]   ˆ p − [f/I − (λ + s)i]   ˆ τ,
IC
b : (1 + γ)δ   ˆ p = −s   ˆ τ + α   ˆ I,
where we have inserted the changes in u and i from above in ICe and used c′p = p1+γ
in the diﬀerentiation of ICb. The share of equity in investment is again denoted by
α ≡ A/I. Both incentive constraints are thus increasing functions in the I,p—space.
Stability requires that the slope of ICe is higher than the slope of ICb. Otherwise,
investment and monitoring intensity would not converge to ﬁnite positive levels after an
exogenous shock. This condition requires that ∇ ≡ (1 + γ)δm−(f/I + 1)α > 0, leading
to equilibrium changes in I and p,7
ˆ I = −
1
∇
[(f/I − (λ + s)i)(1 + γ)δ + (f/I + 1)s]   ˆ τ, (16)
ˆ p = −
1
∇
[(f/I − (λ + s)i)α + ms]   ˆ τ.
Note that the factor f/I − (λ + s)i simpliﬁes to f/I − i under both cash-ﬂow and ACE
taxes. Knowing that f′ > i in credit constrained ﬁrms, and that f/I > f′ due to the
concavity of the production function, this expression is positive. The introduction of a
7Note that m is positive under assumption (A). The condition is fulﬁlled as long as the ﬁrm’s own
equity is not too high.
20small proﬁt tax thus reduces both investment I and the monitoring intensity p. Finally,
the eﬀect on net ﬁscal revenue G is
dG = pI [f/I − λi + (1 − R/p)s]   ˆ τ. (17)
Starting from an untaxed equilibrium excludes complicated tax base eﬀects.
ACE versus Cash-Flow Tax: To compare the eﬃciency implications of ACE and
cash-ﬂow taxes, we study the consequences of introducing small tax rates such that both
taxes yield the same net present value of ﬁscal revenue. What are then the eﬀects on
investment and monitoring under the two regimes, and how do they compare in eﬃciency
terms? Suppose a small cash-ﬂow tax which deﬁnes the tax base by s = 1 and λ = 0,
is introduced at a rate ˆ τCF > 0. Inserting into (16) gives the changes in investment and
monitoring intensity,
ˆ ICF = −[(f/I − i)(1 + γ)δ + f/I + 1]
ˆ τCF
∇




The net present value of revenue increases by dGCF = pI (f/I + 1 − R/p) ˆ τCF. An ACE
tax deﬁnes the tax base by s = 0 and λ = 1. To obtain the same present value of revenue,
dGACE = dGCF, requires a tax rate of
(f/I − i)   ˆ τACE = (f/I + 1 − R/p)   ˆ τCF. (19)
An equal yield ACE system induces changes in investment and monitoring intensity of
ˆ IACE = −(f/I + 1 − R/p)(1 + γ)δ
ˆ τCF
∇




Appendix A2 proves that a cash-ﬂow tax reduces investment and monitoring intensity to
a larger extent than an equal yield ACE tax,
ˆ ICF < ˆ IACE < 0, ˆ pCF < ˆ pACE < 0. (21)
Finally, the consequences of these alternative tax systems for eﬃciency are measured by
the change in the social surplus π∗ = π + G = p(I + f) − (c + R)I as in (14),8
dπ
∗ = [1 + f/I − c
′]pI   ˆ p + [p(1 + f
′) − c − R]I   ˆ I. (22)
8First best monitoring and investment are given by 1 + f/I = c′ and p(1 + f′) = c + R, respectively.
21Substituting c′ = (1 + i)δ from the bank’s incentive constraint (15) into the ﬁrst bracket
yields 1+f/I −(1+i)δ = ve/I > 0 when the tax rate is initially zero. Hence, stimulating
monitoring would boost the entrepreneur’s surplus and, thus, yield an additional social
gain which banks do not take into account when choosing monitoring intensity. The second
bracket in (22) is also positive. The break even condition πb = 0 implies p(1 + i)−c−R >
0 when ﬁrms have positive equity, α > 0. Since f′ > i with binding ﬁnance constraints,
the second square bracket is positive as well. A larger investment scale ﬁnanced with more
lending would raise the bank’s proﬁt by an amount equal to the square bracket on the
margin. However, the additional externally ﬁnanced investment cannot happen because
it would violate the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint and discretely reduce the ﬁrm’s
success probability. Hence, credit rationing leaves some socially proﬁtable investment
expansion unexploited in private equilibrium. Since even a small tax reduces investment
and monitoring, it removes their levels further from the ﬁrst best allocation so that both
tax regimes imply a ﬁrst order welfare loss. Since a cash-ﬂow tax suppresses investment
and monitoring to a larger extent, it also imposes a larger eﬃciency cost relative to an
equal yield ACE system. The ACE tax is clearly superior when banks not only supply
credit but also perform valuable monitoring services and thereby contribute to lower
failure rates in business investment.
Proposition 3 When investment is ﬁnance constrained and bank monitoring improves
success probabilities of ﬁrms, (i) ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes both reduce investment and
monitoring intensity, but (ii) are no longer equivalent. An ACE system reduces investment
levels, success rates and eﬃciency less than an equal yield cash-ﬂow tax.
Banks providing productive monitoring to ﬁrms face a typical hold-up problem: they
have to bear the full monitoring cost, but can only capture part of the returns, depending
on their stake δ in the ﬁrm. In giving an upfront subsidy, the cash-ﬂow tax requires less
external funding and therefore a smaller repayment. It thus reduces the banks’ stake
in the ﬁrm and impairs monitoring incentives. An ACE system, in contrast, provides
22tax relief at the late return stage and, therefore, does not reduce external credit. With
a larger repayment at risk, banks monitor more intensively which contributes to lower
failure rates. Better success prospects, in turn, raise the returns to entrepreneurial eﬀort
which makes it cheaper to incentivize entrepreneurs. Hence, more intensive monitoring
feeds back positively on the incentive compatible investment scale of the ﬁrm. In a setting
of double moral hazard, the timing of tax payments becomes important which is more
favorable under the ACE tax. Given that the most innovative ﬁrms in the economy are
also those which are most likely to face ﬁnance constraints, this non-equivalence between
ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes could be rather important.9
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of corporate taxation when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained
due to moral hazard problems. The general mechanism at work in neoclassical invest-
ment theory, that taxes’ inﬂuence on the user cost of capital determines the investment
distortion, no longer applies. Instead, taxes reduce a ﬁrm’s pledgeable income to out-
side investors, diminish the amount of external funds it can raise, and thus cut down
investment. This has important implications for the eﬃciency properties of speciﬁc tax
regimes which diﬀer substantially from the basic neoclassical investment model with full
information. First of all, proﬁt taxes impose strictly positive ﬁrst order welfare losses even
when tax rates are small. The welfare cost of taxes, as measured by the marginal cost of
public funds, is particularly severe in ﬁrms with low internal funds and very tight credit
constraints. Second, both cash-ﬂow and ACE taxes are no longer neutral with respect to
9Proposition 3 mirrors the ﬁndings of Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) in the context of venture capital
ﬁnancing where a tax relief at the return stage was also found to provide superior incentives compared
to an upfront subsidy. Keuschnigg (2004) has shown that shifting the tax burden from the investment
to the return stage spurs long-run growth in innovative industries. These authors, however, allowed only
for a ﬁxed investment size while this paper endogenizes investment levels and establishes a close link to
the tax reform literature in public ﬁnance.
23investment as they are in the basic neoclassical model with full information. Since young
innovative ﬁrms with large growth prospects and little own funds are most likely to be
ﬁnance constrained, the non-neutrality is probably relevant for the most dynamic sectors
of an advanced economy.
A third important implication for tax policy is that ACE and cash-ﬂow taxes might
not be equivalent as is commonly believed. The paper points to a situation where ﬁnancial
development and eﬃciency in banking is endogenous. When banks, in addition to giving
the required external funds, also perform important monitoring services, the success of
business investment not only depends on the eﬀort of inside entrepreneurs but also on
monitoring incentives. Given this double moral hazard, the timing of tax payments be-
comes important. Since an ACE tax gives tax relief at the late return stage, it is better
for incentives and leads to larger investment levels and success probabilities than an equal
yield cash-ﬂow tax which provides tax relief at the early investment stage.
Appendix
A1 Calibration: Given the parameters τ, i, α,  , σ, the cash-ﬂow sensitivity   =
(1 + i)/m and the incentive constraint β = (1 − τ)f (I)/I − i + (1 + i)α from (7) can
be solved for I and β:
I =
￿
(1 − τ)(1 − σ)
(1 + i)(1/  − α)
￿1/(1−σ)
, β = (1 − τ)/I
1−σ − i + (1 + i)α, A = α   I. (A.1)
These values are used to evaluate the coeﬃcients in the MCPFc-formula.
A2 Investment and Monitoring With Equal Yield Taxes: In order to (21), we
start by comparing the investment response in (18) and (20). The investment distortion
is stronger with cash-ﬂow tax compared to an equal yield ACE tax if
1 + f/I > (1 + γ)δ[p(1 + i) − R]/p ⇔ 1 + f/I > (1 + i)δ. (A.2)
24The second inequality follows from the break-even condition (p(1 + i) − R)δ = c, after
applying pc′ = (1 + γ)c under the isoelastic speciﬁcation of monitoring cost and using
the bank’s incentive constraint c′ = (1 + i)δ in (15). This inequality is fulﬁlled since the
managerial incentive constraint in (15) requires ve > 0 and thus I + f − (1 + i)D > 0
when evaluated at τ = 0.
Monitoring is reduced more strongly under the cash-ﬂow tax if
m > (p(1 + i) − R)α/p ⇔ (1 + γ)δm > (1 + i)δα. (A.3)
The second inequality follows by the same steps noted above. Since f/I > i under ﬁnance
constraints and δ < 1, the requirement that ∇ > 0 guarantees that this inequality holds.
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